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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
Comment on Recent Decisions
BILLS AND NoTEs-PRICE v. NEAL---EFFCT OF NEGLIGENCE OF CASHING
BANK UPON RIGHT TO RETAIN MONEY PAID BY DRAWEE BANK.-A recent
decision in Kentucky appears to have the effect of curbing a careless bank-
ing practice of cashing checks for strangers without proper identification.
In the principal case a stranger, representing himself as being the payee
on a check drawn on plaintiff bank, cashed it at defendant bank. There
was no inquiry made as to his identity. Defendant indorsed the check and
presented it through its collecting bank to plaintiff and received payment
thereon. Several days later the supposed drawer discovered the forgery
and repudiated the check. Plaintiff then brought suit against the defend-
ant to recover back the money it had sent to the defendant. The decision
for the plaintiff was affirmed solely on the grounds that as between banks
the use of care in cashing checks is always presumed, and that defendant's
negligence in this respect therefore "lulled the plaintiff bank into indiffer-
ence as to the drawer's signature," thus causing the plaintiff to pay over
the amount of the check without verifying the signature. Louisa Nat.
Bank v. Kentucky Nat. Bank (Ky. 1931) 39 S. W. (2d) 497.
It is an established rule that money paid upon a mistake of facts and
without consideration, may be recovered in an action for money had and
received. 41 C. J. 50. An exception to this rule was announced in Price V.
Neal (1762) 3 Burr. 1355, 97 Eng. Repr. 871, where it was held that a
drawee on a bill of exchange, who had paid the amount of the bill to an in-
nocent holder for value, and later discovered that the drawer's name had
been forged, could not recover from the party to whom he had paid the
money. And it was contended that the decision of that case should govern
the facts of the principal case, on the ground that the drawee is bound to
know his drawer's (depositor's) signature. But that case was supported
strictly on the equitable doctrine that as between two persons having equal
equities, one of whom must suffer, the legal title shall prevail. Both plain-
tiff and defendant having dealt with the bill as if it were genuine, as be-
tween the two, the holder of the money had legal title. It is true that
Lord Mansfield said that the "drawee must know the signature of his
drawer" and that he was negligent in not recognizing it, but it is clear
that his decision was not based upon this fact, but rather that it would be
"against conscience" to allow the plaintiff to recover it. To permit the
negligence of plaintiff bank to be a controlling factor in the principal case,
and thus to bar a recovery by it would be contrary to the established doc-
trine that "negligence on the part of the payor is not in general a bar to the
recovery of money paid under a mistake of fact." Ames, The Doctrine of
Price v. Neal (1891) 4 HARv. L. REv. 297, citing Kelly v. Solari (1841) 9 M.
and W. 54, 152 Eng. Repr. 24; Appleton Bank v. McGilvray (1855) 4 Gray
518, 70 Mass. 518. But it is to be borne in mind that recovery was allowed
in these cases strictly on equitable grounds, and as Lord Mansfield held, "If
a man has actually paid what the law would not have compelled him to pay,
Washington University Open Scholarship
ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
but what in equity and conscience he ought, he cannot recover it back in an
action for money had and received. But where money is paid under a mis-
take of fact which there is no ground to claim in conscience, the party may
recover it back again by this kind of action." Bize v. Dickason (1786) 1
T. R. 285, 99 Eng. Repr. 1097. Thus it would seem to be inequitable to al-
low the defendant (the cashing bank in the principal case) to retain the
money that it had received by virtue of the confidence that one bank places
in another, and to permit the defendant to take undue advantage of a situa-
tion brought about by this confidence. "It is a matter of general informa-
tion that in dealings between banks and especially with reference to clear-
ings, banks will adjust and pay differences between each other or between
themselves and the clearing house upon the faith of the indorsements by the
other banks of checks involved in such settlement, relying on such indorse-
ments as protecting them in such payment should the subsequent and more
careful scrutiny of the signatures disclose forgeries in the making and in-
dorsing of the checks so paid." (Writer's italics) 3 R. C. L. 527.
To allow the doctrine of Price v. Neal to be brought in for the purpose
of barring a recovery in a case of this kind, would upset this established
banking practice and thus tend to destroy the celerity and facility with
which checks are cleared. The doctrine as laid down by Lord Mansfield
could hardly be applied here where the intervening considerations of pres-
ent day banking practice figure so largely in the case. For cases in accord
with the instant decision see, Farmers' Nat. Bank of Augusta v. Farmers'
and Traders' Bank of Maysville (1914) 159 Ky. 141, 166 S. W. 986, L. R. A.
1915 A. 77; Ellis and Morton v. Ohio Life Ins. and Trust Co. (1855) 4 Ohio
St. 628; cases contra: Commercial and Farmers' Nat. Bank v. First Nat.
Bank (1868) 30 Md. 11; Howard and Preston v. Miss. Valley Bank of
Vicksburg (1876) 28 La. Ann. 727, 26 Am. Rep. 105.
D. P., '33.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-WTNESSES-CMPULSION OvER ABSENT NA-
TIONALS.-In Blackmer v. United States (1932) 52 Sup. Ct. 252, the Su-
preme Court affirmed the decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals of the
District of Columbia holding constitutional the Walsh Act which provides
for a method of compelling attendance in Federal Courts of witnesses ab-
sent in foreign countries. Blackmer v. United States (1931) 49 F. (2d)
523. For a comment on the decision of the Appeals Court see (1931) 17
ST. LoUIs L. REv. 85.
As did the Appeals Court, the Supreme Court held that by virtue of the
obligations of citizenship, the citizen is bound by laws made applicable to
him in a foreign country. Cook v. Tail (1924) 265 U. S. 47; United States
v. Bowman (1922) 260 U. S. 94. Legislation of Congress is usually con-
strued to apply only within the territorial limits of the United States, but
the question of its application so far as citizens are concerned is one of con-
struction and not of legislative power. American Banana Co. v. United
States (1909) 213 U. S. 347; Robertson v. Railroad Labor Board (1925)
268 U. S. 619. The Court entertained no doubt as to the sovereign power of
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